There is an inextricable link between cultural and clinical safety. In Australia high‐profile Aboriginal deaths in custody, publicised institutional racism in health services and the international Black Lives Matter movement have cemented momentum to ensure culturally safe care. However, racism within health professionals and health professional students remains a barrier to increasing the number of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health professionals. The Australian Health Practitioner Regulation Agency's Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Health Strategy's objective to ‘eliminate racism from the (...) health system’, and the recent adoption of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples led cultural safety definition, has instigated systems level reflections on decolonising practice. This article explores cultural safety as the conceptual antithesis to racism, examining its origins, and contemporary evolution led by Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples in Australia, including its development in curriculum innovation. The application of cultural safety is explored using in‐depth reflection, and the crucial development of integrating critical consciousness theory, as a precursor to culturally safe practice, is discussed. Novel approaches to university curriculum development are needed to facilitate culturally safe and decolonised learning and working environments, including the key considerations of non‐Indigenous allyship and collaborative curriculum innovations and initiatives. (shrink)

Abstract:A society that uses drills and conditioning to train its machine learning models risks creating an alienated situation between human and machine in social life, as these teaching methods generate a lack of responsibility for the actions produced by such machines. Both John Dewey and Gilbert Simondon present conceptions and ideas that shed a different light on such alienated human–machine relationships in machine learning: that is, a critique of mere drilling and training as an educational method; the mode of existence (...) of technical objects; and the importance of experience and practicality, for example, learning by doing. After giving an introduction to Dewey's and Simondon's conceptions, the analysis of case studies will show, among other things, that machine learning models need constant care by engineers and programmers. This allows us to highlight Simondon's and Dewey's critique of ancient philosophy. Whereas the latter separates thought and practice, labor and leisure, Simondon and Dewey foreground activities that are capable of bringing both together: Dewey's aesthetic experience and Simondon's technical activity. (shrink)

Il saggio mira a superare l’antinomia tra la teoria di Wölfflin e quella di D’Ors, cercando una conciliazione tra storia dell’arte ed estetica. La contrapposizione tra il rigore di un principio formale e la sensibilità di un principio materiale viene superata grazie a un principio specificamente marino e alla sua ambivalenza (fonte di vita e di morte, strumento di legame e di dissociazione, principio di dolcezza e di aggressione). Infine, viene richiamata l’arte del modellare, in cui l’argilla trova la forma (...) attraverso la deformazione e in cui dall’amorfo si sviluppa una ricca vegetazione, e, attraverso Bachelard, viene sviluppata una paradossale analogia con l’arte del fabbro che però trova inaspettata conferma nelle curve carezzevoli degli esuberanti decori di ferro tipici del barocco siciliano. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Guest Editors' NoteKevin Taylor (bio) and Johnathan Flowers (bio)Welcome to this special fall 2021 issue of Education & Culture. we are pleased to bring you the second installment of this special three-part issue on Deweyan approaches to contemporary issues at the intersection of data and technology.In his extensive writings on philosophy and technology, Luciano Floridi has argued that "the time has come to translate environmental ethics into terms of (...) infosphere and informational entities, for the land we now inhabit is not just the earth."1 This may be appropriate from a Deweyan perspective as Dewey's approach to aesthetic experience focuses on the living organism within its environment and we have become digital humans in digital environments. Our digital world feels unstable because it is in constant change, but Dewey reminds us that "all interactions that effect stability and order in the whirling flux of change are rhythms. There is ebb and flow, systole and diastole: ordered change."2 The rhythms of our digital world pervade all experience in what he termed "doing and undergoing." We are swimming in a sea of data and leaving behind what investigative reporter Julia Angwin terms data pollution.3 But in the data-driven world, that data pollution is collected, analyzed, and monetized by big data tech firms in a kind of societal harm that threatens digital democracy.Whereas part one saw contributions from five scholars throwing curriculum and technology into sharp relief, this issue asks questions such as "Where ought we to begin?", "What does feminist pragmatism have to tell us about the pandemic and online teaching and learning?", and "Do the aims and means of data and technology align with human experience?"John Machielsen's "Responsible Imagineering: John Dewey's Pluralistic Ethics and Technological Innovation" seems like a good place to begin. Machielsen argues for placing Dewey's ethics at the starting point from which technological innovation can flourish. Driven by Deweyan concepts of intelligence, education, and imagination, Machielsen explores, among other themes, socially disruptive technology from the perspective of pragmatists who constantly reconstruct concepts and values through the process of Deweyan inquiry. Human beings are imaginative and plastic with regard to problem solving, and what is needed here is to keep the barriers between technology and everyday life porous so that we do not risk compartmentalizing them as distinctly different realms.In the next two essays, we turn our attention to the growing concerns surrounding intelligent technology in online educational environments. Great strides have been made in the field of artificial intelligence, and intelligent technology has inserted itself into various aspects of data and technology, such as machine learning that creates personalized learning paths for students. Whether these technologies fall under the [End Page 1] category of algorithms, machine learning, or artificial intelligence, they raise questions about their potential impact on teaching and learning.Olivier Del Fabbro is also suspicious of the current state of intelligent technology in his article, "How to Teach Machines in Artificial Intelligence: Technical Education in John Dewey, Gilbert Simondon, and Machine Learning." Citing the Google machine learning model that classified African Americans as gorillas, Del Fabbro utilizes Dewey and Gilbert Simondon to argue that the human–machine relationship is still immature and at risk of creating an alienated situation out of undesirable bad habits. Intelligent technology requires constant care by engineers and programmers to form good habits and adapt to social life if their aims are to align with Deweyan pedagogy.As Del Fabbro focuses on intelligent technology, the human dimension of online learning comes under scrutiny in two articles that adopt feminist pragmatist methods. Krissah Marga B. Taganas's article, "Feminist-Pragmatist Perspectives on Online Education: Challenging and Changing Online Educational Conversation," rightfully acknowledges how the pandemic has magnified existing inequalities in society. The rapid migration to online learning was necessarily expedited in the face of uncertainties surrounding public health, but how do educators migrate classes that were not designed with online learning in mind to begin with? Dewey emphasized schools as sites and tools for change, but how does online education provide an optimal social environment for learning? Taganas utilizes feminist pragmatism as an important philosophical resource to... (shrink)

Although most aspects of world and self-consciousness are inherently subjective, neuroscience studies in humans and non-human animals provide correlational and causative indices of specific links between brain activity and representation of the self and the world. In this article we review neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and neuropsychological data supporting the hypothesis that different levels of self and world representation in vertebrates rely upon i) a 'basal' subcortical system that includes brainstem, hypothalamus and central thalamic nuclei and that may underpin the primary (or (...) anoetic) consciousness likely present in all vertebrates; and ii) a forebrain system that include the medial and lateral structures of the cerebral hemispheres and may sustain the most sophisticated forms of consciousness (e.g. noetic (knowledge based) and autonoetic, reflective knowledge). We posit a mutual, bidirectional functional influence between these two major brain circuits. We conclude that basic aspects of consciousness like primary self and core self (based on anoetic and noetic consciousness) are present in many species of vertebrates and that, even self-consciousness (autonoetic consciousness) does not seem to be a prerogative of humans and of some non-human primates but may, to a certain extent, be present in some other mammals and birds. (shrink)

The present work introduces the neuropsychological paradigm as a new approach to studying ancient literature. In the first part of the article, an epistemological framework for the proper use of neuropsychology in relation to ancient literature is presented. The article then discusses neuropsychological methods of studying different human experiences and dimensions already addressed by ancient literatures. The experiences of human encounters with gods among ancient cultures are first considered, through the contributions of Julian Jaynes and Eric R. Dodds. The concepts (...) of right and left in the Bible, and that of soul are then discussed. Ecstatic experience in Paul of Tarsus is also presented, with a particular focus on glossolalia. Neuroscientific differences between mindful and unitive meditative practices are then described referring to ancient Buddhist literature, and finally a brief description of dreams in ancient Greek literature is proposed. Neuropsychology variously enables a more profound understanding of themes characterizing human experiences that ancient literature has already explored; these investigations prove that the collaboration of neuroscience and humanistic studies can return fruitful and interesting results. (shrink)

This paper motivates, explains, and defends a new account of the content of thought experiments. I begin by briefly surveying and critiquing three influential accounts of thought experiments: James Robert Brown’s Platonist account, John Norton’s deflationist account that treats them as picturesque arguments, and a cluster of views that I group together as mental model accounts. I use this analysis to motivate a set of six desiderata for a new approach. I propose that we treat thought experiments primarily as aesthetic (...) objects, specifically fictions, and then use this analysis to characterize their content and ultimately assess their epistemic success. Taking my starting point from Kendall Walton’s account of representation (Mimesis as make-believe, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1990), I argue that the best way to understand the content of thought experiments is to treat them as props for imagining fictional worlds. Ultimately, I maintain that, in terms of their form and content, thought experiments share more with literary fictions and pictorial representations than with either argumentation or observations of the Platonic realm. Moreover, while they inspire imaginings, thought experiments themselves are not mental kinds. My approach redirects attention towards what fixes the content of any given thought experiment and scrutinizes the assumptions, cognitive capacities and conventions that generate them. This view helps to explain what seems plausible about Brown’s, Norton’s, and the mental modelers’ views. (shrink)

Biological and Neuroscientific Foundations of Philosophy is an authoritative text addressing both academicians and students, and proposes an integrated and holistic view of scientific study and presents a new paradigm by which to study philosophy. It highlights, in a systematic and sufficiently simple manner, the fundamental role of neuroscience, neuropsychology and biology within philosophical reflection.

There are two distinct interpretations of the role that Feynman diagrams play in physics: (i) they are calculational devices, a type of notation designed to keep track of complicated mathematical expressions; and (ii) they are representational devices, a type of picture. I argue that Feynman diagrams not only have a calculational function but also represent: they are in some sense pictures. I defend my view through addressing two objections and in so doing I offer an account of representation that explains (...) why Feynman diagrams represent. The account that I advocate is a version of that defended by Kendall Walton, which provides us with a basic characterization of the way that representations in general work and is particularly useful for understanding distinctively pictorial representations - in Walton's terms, depictions. The question of the epistemic function of Feynman diagrams as pictorial representations is left for another time. (shrink)

In this paper, I take up the following puzzle: If Feynman diagrams represent states of affairs, but do not do so truthfully what can their epistemic value be? I argue that Feynman diagrams have been epistemically powerful (at least in part) because, as pictorial representations, they facilitate an understanding of quantum electrodynamics, and quantum field theories more generally. Drawing on Richard Feynman’s own remarks and Catherine Z. Elgin’s account of the role of understanding in science, I tease out what it (...) might mean to have an understanding of something that is not factive. Although my approach allows for a thin sense of substantively non-factive epistemic success, it is continuous with a factive sense of understanding that is more familiar in the sciences. (shrink)

In 2002, Evolution and Human Behavior published a study purporting to show that the differences in toy preferences commonly attributed to girls and boys can also be found in male and female vervet monkeys, tracing the origin of these differing preferences back to a common ancestor. Despite some flaws in its design and the prima facie implausibility of some of its central claims, this research received considerable attention in both scientific circles and the popular media. In what follows, I survey (...) some of the problems with this study that seem to be characteristic of research into sex differences in a particular research program in evolutionary psychology. I suggest that an epistemology of ignorance is at work that suppresses the methods and insights of an earlier research program, which emphasized the complexity and contingency that ultimately grounds the variety of human behaviors, in favor of one that has been widely criticized as empirically flawed and politically pernicious. I conclude with some speculative remarks on the persistence of this problematic research program in evolutionary psychology. (shrink)

In recent years there has been increasing interest in scientific understanding as an epistemic success term that is distinct from scientific knowledge (see, for example, De Regt, Leonelli and Eigner 2009). Although this literature is diverse, three dominant strands can be found that have rather deeper roots in the philosophy of science: understanding as unification (Friedman 1974; Kitcher 1981); understanding through mechanistic thinking as in certain types of causal modelling (Salmon 1998; Woodward 2003); and a kind of contextualist pluralist approach (...) to understanding (De Regt and Dieks 2005; De Regt 2009; 2014), which is in some ways similar to the account offered by Nelson Goodman (1968, 1978) and Catherine Elgin (1997, 2004). Proponents of these views often see them as complimentary or at least not contradictory. However, they have not yet to been brought neatly together in a single account. This is what I propose to do. At the heart of my approach is the thought that we should treat the characteristic content of understanding as pictorial, in contrast to the characteristic content of knowledge, which is propositional. By virtue of the distinctive ways in which they present their content, epistemically efficacious pictures exemplify, unify, show mechanical (and other) causal relations, allow for multiple readings and facilitate the contextualisation of their content, while still having determinate content. In other words, features of pictorial content facilitate cognitive and evaluative procedures that are characteristic of understanding and have already been identified as such in the literature. That understanding should be treated as something like “getting the picture” is supported, albeit weakly, by multiple remarks, more or less well-developed, linking understanding to picturing that can also be found in the literature on scientific understanding, as we shall see. (shrink)

_The Applied Ethics Primer_ offers a concise introduction to both basic argumentation and normative ethical theory. The concepts discussed reflect the ethical theories that currently ground most professional ethics codes and debates in applied ethics. More inclusive than many similar resources, this primer gives students a sense of the truly global history of ethics, while remaining squarely focused on providing practical tools for ethical decision-making. -/- Also available as an open educational resource (see link below). -/- (Don't buy it from (...) Amazon, they're charging twice the publisher's price.). (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that there are good, scientifically credible reasons for thinking that some nonhuman animals might have genders. We begin by considering why the sex/gender distinction has been important for feminist politics yet has also been difficult to maintain. We contrast contemporary views that trouble gender with those typical of traditional sex difference research, which has enjoyed considerable feminist critique, and argue that the anthropocentric focus of feminist accounts of gender weakens these critiques. Then, drawing from Jordan-Young’s (...) concept of gendered norms of reaction and van Anders’ Sexual Configurations Theory, we consider what it might mean to say that animals other than humans are gendered in a scientifically robust sense that does not simply reduce gender to sex or project human gender norms onto other animals. It is important that such an account is not only sensitive to its political ramifications for feminist and queer politics but is also sensitive to the ways in which troubling the human–nonhuman animal divide may seem to threaten those humans whose oppression is constituted by dehumanization and animalization. We suggest that, in fact, the contrary is true. We find that decolonial feminists have plausibly argued that animalizing oppression is premised on the human–animal divide and that the idea of nonhuman animal genders fits naturally with some traditional Indigenous ways of thinking about other animals and their relations with humans. (shrink)

The interdisciplinary group of authors featured in this focus issue contribute to conversations at the intersection of anthropology and ethics by exploring ethical self‐making and moral experimentation among faith‐based actors in a range of humanitarian settings. Kari Henquinet describes the genealogies of American evangelical humanitarianism by focusing on the ethical self‐formation of early World Vision leaders. Rachel Schneider and Sara Williams each explore practices by which relatively privileged individuals seek to cultivate virtue by engaging with those on the margins, in (...) poor, urban neighborhoods in South Africa, and through packaged tours in Israel/palestine, respectively. Sarah Tobin describes projects of Islamic self‐making among displaced refugee women in Jordan. Although they examine a wide range of subjects and settings, they explore a common set of themes, two of which I discuss here: moral experimentation, and engagements with suffering, poverty, and inequality. (shrink)

Meynell’s contention is that feminists should attend to pictures in science as distinctive bearers of epistemic content that cannot be reduced to propositions. Remarks on the practice and function of medical illustration—specifically, images Nancy Tuana used in her discussion of the construction of ignorance of women’s sexual function (2004)—show pictures to be complex and powerful epistemic devices. Their affinity with perennial feminist concerns, the relation between epistemic subject and object, and the nature of social knowledge, are of particular interest.

I argue that it is time for many feminists to rethink their attitudes towards evolutionary biology, not because feminists have been wrong to be deeply sceptical about many of its claims, both explicit and implicit, but because biology itself has changed. A new appreciation for the importance of development in biology has become mainstream and a new ontology, associated with developmental systems theory, has been introduced over the last two decades. This turn challenges some of the features of evolutionary biology (...) that have most troubled feminists. DST undermines the idea of biologicales sence and challenges both nature / nurture and nature/ culture distinctions. Freed from these conceptual constraints, evolutionary biology no longer poses the problems that have justified feminist scepticism. Indeed, feminists have already found useful applications for DST and I argue that they should expand their use of DST to support more radical and wide-ranging political theories. Si les féministes n’ont pas eu tort d’être profondément sceptiques face aux nombreuses revendications de la biologie, leur attitude face à cette science doit être remise en question car la biologie s’est transformée au courant des dernières décennies. La «théorie des systèmes de développement» est une théorie qui s’est considérablement développée et qui a pris beaucoup d’ampleur. Cette théorie n’accepte pas le concept d’essence biologique ce qui pose un défi important à la distinction nature/ culture. Une des conséquences de cet apport théorique est que le scepticisme des féministes face à la biologie de l’évolution n’est plus justifié car la biologie ne comporte plus les contraintes essentialistes qui s’avéraient contentieuses. En effet, certaines féministes ont déjà trouvé des applications utiles pour la TDS et nous avançons que les féministes doivent maintenant élargir l’utilisation de la TDS car la porté de celle-ci pourrait être significative dans d’autres domaines tel celui de la théorie politique. (shrink)

Résumé — II s’agit ici de montrer que la mimèsis tragique chez Aristote a un sens éthique, dans la mesure où elle donne à réfléchir sur les conditions du bonheur humain. En effet, en montrant des personnages soumis aux vicissitudes de la fortune, elle donne à réfléchir sur la contingence du bonheur, que la vertu ne suffit pas à assurer. En ce sens, la mimèsis tragique est le pendant de l’Éthique à Nicomaque qui définit les conditions morales du bonheur. Ce (...) sens éthique de la tragédie peut déboucher sur une portée éthique, dans la mesure où la connaissance qu’elle procure de la condition humaine et du hasard qui règne sur la vie des hommes s’oppose à toute hubris en faisant prendre conscience au spectateur de la fragilité du bonheur. Dès lors, on peut dire que le sens éthique de la tragédie selon Aristote est d’abord intellectuel, mais qu’il peut avoir du coup une portée pratique. La différence entre Platon et Aristote sur ce point vient de la différence de leurs conceptions éthiques : pour Platon en effet, et contrairement à son disciple, la condition nécessaire et suffisante du bonheur est la vertu, de telle sorte que la mimèsis tragique, en tant qu’elle présente des hommes soumis à des malheurs sans pour autant avoir nécessairement commis une faute, donne une fausse idée du bonheur. C’est pourquoi chez Platon la tragédie ne peut donner un enseignement éthique, contrairement à ce qui se passe chez Aristote. (shrink)

The Scientific Imagination: Philosophical and Psychological Perspectives, edited by Arnon Levy and Peter Godfrey-Smith (2020), attempts to bring some much-neede.

What I propose in this article are ways to think about and discuss cases of political correctness so as to avoid polarizing polemics and increase mutual understanding. The goal is to help us envision and create a more just and equitable institution by talking with each other rather than talking past each other. I maintain that politically correct interventions are motivated by the following three claims about the current term or practice that they seek to reform: 1) the term or (...) practice, is considered insulting to the members of a group to which it pertains; 2) the term or practice implies something that is false and reflects and reinforces this inaccuracy; 3) the term or practice implicitly endorses or maintains unjust or otherwise pernicious attitudes about the group that facilitates discrimination and various other harms against them. (shrink)

The topic of Ron Paterson’s book which was recently reviewed by Deborah Oyer only scratches the surface of a disturbing problem that is not confined to medicine, as health care delivery is a multidisciplinary experience for patients. I hear stories from patients about bullying dieticians, callous nurses, and institutions that espouse patient-centred care yet fail to deliver it to individuals who are unwell, worried, and vulnerable in an unfamiliar environment into which they have come for help. Maybe being conversant with (...) standard guidelines and care pathways for specific health conditions makes it too easy forget that, for individual patients, ill health is a unique experience within their life-world. It could and should be our default approach as clinicians (and ancillary personnel) to acknowledge the fundamental competence that patients bring to health service encounters and to help them comprehend their options and the ramifications of their preferences within their life-world. Unl. (shrink)

This essay argues that the antitrafficking movement's dominant rhetorical and conceptual framework of human trafficking as "sold sex" has significant limitations that deserve greater critical moral reflection. This framework overlooks key issues of social and economic injustice, and eclipses the experiences of marginalized people and communities, including immigrants and gay, lesbian, bisexual, transgender, intersex, and queer people, whose welfare and empowerment have been key concerns for progressive people of faith. By asking what insights progressive Christian social ethics might contribute to (...) shaping alternative perspectives on antitrafficking analysis and activism, we explore progressive Christian critiques of neoliberalism and feminist critiques of the heteronormative family as resources for crafting analyses of and responses to human trafficking that foreground queer, feminist, and antiracist commitments. (shrink)

For many immigrants to the United States, between 1892 and 1924, admission was contingent upon a medical inspection at an immigration centre, such as the one located at Ellis Island in the harbour of New York City. Much like passing through customs or security at airports today, these medical inspections were dreaded by immigrant travellers, and United States Government and Public Health Service publications show that these medical inspections were escalating in intensity and emphasis during the early twentieth-century. The purpose (...) of the PHS inspections becomes especially evident when looking at the gender considerations, or lack thereof, which arose during medical inspections at Ellis Island. A gender analysis of the PHS medical inspections, examined through the use of oral histories and photographs, provides a window into understanding the primary concern of the United States Public Health Service. (shrink)

In this paper I examine third wave leminism in the hopes of shedding light on its relationship to the concurrent contemporary backlash against leminism. I investigate this by attempting to answer two questions. First, given the nature of the first and second waves, is the third wave appropriately so called? I tentatively conclude that it is not. Second, I ask whether the issue of identity, which is central to third wave analysis, is addressed well by third wavers. I suggest that (...) there are serious problems with the rejection of identity politics that characterizes much third wave feminism, particularly in the repudiation of second wave feminism that seems to accompany it. I conclude that, at best, the third wave seems unprepared to light the present backlash and, at worst, it appears to be a part of it. (shrink)

In this paper I tackle the question of what basic form an analytical method for articulating and ultimately assessing visual representations should take. I start from the assumption that scientific images, being less prone to interpretive complication than artworks, are ideal objects from which to engage this question. I then assess a recent application of Nelson Goodman's aesthetics to the project of parsing scientific images, Laura Perini's ‘The truth in pictures’. I argue that, although her project is an important one, (...) her Goodmanian conventionalism produces a method of analysis that is incapable of adequately parsing a certain class of pictures and her focus on truth is unnecessary. This speaks against the promise of Goodman's analytical strategy for elucidating visual content and reasoning in the sciences and elsewhere. As an alternative, I develop John Willats’ analytical method and compare it to Perini's through engaging three of her examples—a chemical diagram, a graph and an electron micrograph. Ultimately, a space remains open for a mixed system where Willats’ account provides pictorial analysis and the Goodman–Perini approach parses visual languages. (shrink)

In this chapter, Meynell offers an overview of a specific scientific research program known as evolutionary psychology. She begins by defining two senses of this moniker in order to clearly circumscribe that which has been the target of most critique—feminist and otherwise. She reviews the key commitments of this problematic research program and rehearses common criticisms before illustrating them with a case study. The chapter concludes with some reflections on the rhetorical positioning of this research program and a few remarks (...) about a new supposedly feminist version of evolutionary psychology. (shrink)

L’ouvrage de Christophe Rogue, Comprendre Platon, présente l’ensemble de la philosophie platonicienne, à l’exception peut-être de son aspect politique, abordé rapidement au chapitre 3. Il ne s’agit pas là cependant d’une lacune de l’ouvrage, mais d’une nécessité interne à son projet : Ch. Rogue propose une interprétation de l’ensemble des Dialogues, et c’est le fil directeur de l’ouvrage qui a pour conséquence la place réduite des aspects proprement politiques de la réflexion platonicienne. I...

I propose to explore Plato’s political notion of “bond” (desmos) and to determine its relationship with philia (friendship) between citizens, a sine qua non condition of community, and which can be identified with what we call “the social link”. In this perspective, two texts are examined: The Laws, VII, 793a-d and The Statesman, 305e sqq.). Although the term desmos is examined in each of them from a different point of view (objectively in the Laws, where it designates the customs which (...) streamline and strengthen the legislative edifice; subjectively in the Statesman, where it designates the true opinion present in souls, which enables them to harmonize their conceptions and therefore their actions), in fact desmos is formed each time by the common ways of doing things, which are based on common opinions. The fruit of education, an essential and primary political endeavor, the absence of desmos renders philia, that is, the social link, impossible, and therefore community equally impossible when understood as multiplicity unity of plurality. (shrink)

La vie des abeilles de Maeterlinck est un ouvrage à la fois scientifique et littéraire, non pas parce qu’il appartiendrait à la science par son exactitude et à la littérature par son style, mais en ce qu’il invite à penser l’unité des deux domaines. Les aspects littéraires de l’ouvrage (beauté de l’écriture, usage des images, de l’analogie, etc.) ne sont pas des accessoires, mais des outils indispensables à l’élaboration d’un authentique savoir sur les abeilles, c’est-à-dire un savoir qui reconnaît la (...) part d’inconnu et le mystère qui subsistent en dépit de toutes les explications physiques et mécaniques que l’on peut par ailleurs donner des phénomènes observés. Etre scientifique, dans cette perspective, c’est-à-dire donner à connaître, c’est donc être littéraire. Cette conception de la science repose en dernière instance sur une conception philosophique de l’univers comme un tout où toutes choses sont reliées, unies, par des relations d’analogies, ce qui fonde et justifie l’emploi d’un style symboliste. (shrink)

Le discours socratique est toujours présenté par Platon comme cause d’effets affectifs : il bouleverse, provoque la colère ou la honte, donnant ainsi l’impression aux interlocuteurs du philosophe d’être ensorcelés par lui. C’est seulement par ce biais qu’il agit aussi sur la partie rationnelle de l’âme, en modifiant éventuellement ses opinions. La raison en est qu’il cherche à influer, non pas sur la partie rationnelle de l’âme, mais sur l’âme tout entière : les opinions dépendent en effet de l’ensemble de (...) la structure psychique, donc des rapports entre les différentes parties de l’âme. (shrink)

Plutôt que de proposer des monographies objectives et académiques, la collection "aimer les philosophes" laisse le champ libre à de grands spécialistes pour livrer une lecture personnelle de l'auteur ou du courant philosophique qui est au cœur de leur vie spirituelle. Un cheminement de pensée enthousiaste en compagnie des classiques de notre tradition.